[2008.2.23]肯尼亚:Still stalled on the edge 依然停滞在动乱的边缘
闵行春秋 :: 求知若渴 :: 世界历史 :: 发展中国家现代化比较
第1页/共1页
[2008.2.23]肯尼亚:Still stalled on the edge 依然停滞在动乱的边缘
Kenya肯尼亚
Still stalled on the edge 依然停滞在动乱的边缘
Feb 21st 2008 | NAIROBI
From The Economist print edition
The political remedy is obvious, but hard to accept
显而易见需要政治上的调解,但这种调解又很难为各方接受
THE settlement to heal Kenya's political agony may be edging closer but will it be a meaningful one? Negotiating teams last week met “secretly” at a lodge in the Tsavo game park, watched over by a former United Nations secretary-general, Kofi Annan, and resumed talks this week. They have agreed to stop the violence, address the humanitarian emergency, bring perpetrators of ethnic cleansing to justice and set up an independent review of the election. But can they agree on the grand coalition government Kenya needs to haul itself back from the brink?
肯尼亚各方正向达成最终协议靠近,这些协议将用来应对当前政治动荡。然而,这将的协议有意义么?谈判小组在联合国前秘书长科菲·安南监督下,于上周在自然公园的一个住处秘密地见面了。这周,谈判恢复,双方同意停止暴行,解决人道主义危机,将实施种族清洗的罪犯送到法庭,重新举行一次独立的选举。但是,他们会同意建立一个目前肯尼亚所需要的大联合政府以把这个国家从内容的边缘拉回来吗?
If an agreement continues to elude the negotiators, or if one is produced and proves flimsy, the violence that has racked parts of the country since its disputed election on December 27th could return. Some1,000 Kenyans have been killed so far and more than 300,000 displaced.
如果协议不能得到代表们的认同,或如果产生出来的这样一个协议被证明是软弱无力的话,暴行会卷土重来。自从12月27日选举产生争议以来,这场席卷肯尼亚一部分地区的暴行已经有1000个肯尼亚人被杀死,另有超过30万人流离失所。
On February 21st the head of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Raila Odinga, was still holding out for a change in the constitution that would create a prime minister's post. Mr Odinga assumes he would be this figure in a transitional government and that half his cabinet would be party colleagues. In return, he would drop objections to Mwai Kibaki staying on as president until new elections in two years' time. The president would remain “head of state”, but with reduced powers. The prime minister would become “head of government”, answerable to parliament[u1] .
2月21日,反对党橙色民主运动的领导人奥廷加仍然试图拖延时间以对争取修宪,从而实现创设一个首相职位的目的。奥廷加先生认为他将在一个过渡政府中担任这一角色,内阁一半的成员也将是他的党内同事。作为回报,在两年后新的选举之前,他将放弃拒绝承认甘巴里担任总统。总统仍将是“国家领导人”,但权力将有所减少,而他担任的首相将成为“政府领导人”,对议会负责。
Mr Odinga says Mr Kibaki promised him a similar role back in 2002, in return for supporting his presidential bid, but then reneged. If the present talks fail, he says, there will be more “mass action”. That sounds like incitement. But it is probably true that not even Mr Odinga, a mesmerising[u2] presence to his supporters, will be able to control the hate-mongers[u3] on his side if he is left empty-handed again.
奥廷加先生说甘巴里总统在2002年的时候曾许诺他一个类似的职位,以作为支持他担任总统的回报,但后来甘巴里总统失言了。奥廷加先生表示,如果当前的谈判失败,肯尼亚会出现更多“大规模行动”。这听起来像是煽动,这听起来像是煽动,但也许可能真的如果奥廷加先生两手空空一无所获的话,就算他对于那些支持者有足够吸引力,他也无法控制支持他的那些煽动仇恨的家伙们。
Agreeing to keep Mr Kibaki in office is a big concession. Election observers mostly agree that Mr Kibaki stole the decisive votes to squeak[u4] back in for a second term. Yet the bigger concession will have to come from the government. By divvying up[u5] many of the powers of the president to a new prime minister and a parliament that is used to being sidelined, the government will be excluding the Kikuyu hardliners and financiers who, since independence in 1963, have used the presidency as an easy lock on power and wealth. Mr Kibaki is keen that any accord should be under the existing constitution, and this reluctance to ditch[u6] the hardliners may be why negotiations have dragged on[u7] so slowly. But on February 21st a government negotiator said that the post of prime minister had been “more or less agreed on”; it would have executive powers but be subject to a sunset clause, expiring either with the dissolution of parliament or the enactment of a new constitution.
同意让甘巴里纽结担任总统对于奥廷加先生来说是一个巨大的让步。大多数选举观察员们都同意甘巴里先生通过做手脚才非常勉强地获得了他担任总统的第二个任期。然而政府将不得不作出更大的让步。总统要把他的许多权力分给新设的总理和议会,而议会过去常常是作为旁观者存在的。新政府将排除基库尤强硬派和金融家们,而这些人自肯尼亚1963年独立以来,一直把总统职位作为确保他们的权力和财富的捷径。甘巴里先生强烈要求任何协定都要在现在宪法下制定,他不愿意清除那些强硬派,这也许是目前为什么谈判进展如此慢的原因。但是在2月21日,一个政府代表表示首相的职位已经“或多或少地被同意了”,它将拥有行政执行权力但要服从原有的条款,这意味着排除了解散议会或实行新宪法。
Some pessimists meanwhile point out that a divided executive may make Kenya more unstable, especially if the division is along ethnic lines. That is a risk most ordinary Kenyans are ready to take. They are backed by America, the European Union and the African Union. George Bush, on a five-nation visit to Africa this week, emphasised that Kenya needs “real” power-sharing. He sent his secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, on a one-day visit to Nairobi to push the two sides closer. She promised generosity in return for a unity government—but gave warning that “the current stalemate and the circumstances are not going to permit business as usual with the United States.”
一些悲观主义者同时指出,权力的划分也许会使肯尼亚更加不稳定,特别是如果这种权力划分是按种族界限来的话。但这是一个大多数普通肯尼亚人准备接受的冒险。他们得到了美国、欧盟和非盟的支持。本周在非洲进行五国访问的美国总统布什强调肯尼亚需要“真正的”分享权力。他派他的国务聊赖斯,对肯尼亚首都内罗毕进行为时一天的访问,以推动双方的和解。赖斯许诺说如果肯尼亚能成立一个联合政府的话,美国会慷慨解囊以作为回报。但她同时警告说,“目前的政治僵局和环境将无法使肯尼亚与美国照常往来。”<hr class=msocomoff align=left width="33%" SIZE=1>
[u1]hold out for
[口](为等待更好时机)拖延时间
[u2]Mesmerize v.施以催眠术, 迷住
[u3]煽动仇恨者
[u4]非常勉强地通过; 非常侥幸地成功[获胜]
[u5]分掉; 分摊
[u6]]摆脱, 抛开, 避开; 逃避
[u7]拖延
Still stalled on the edge 依然停滞在动乱的边缘
Feb 21st 2008 | NAIROBI
From The Economist print edition
The political remedy is obvious, but hard to accept
显而易见需要政治上的调解,但这种调解又很难为各方接受
THE settlement to heal Kenya's political agony may be edging closer but will it be a meaningful one? Negotiating teams last week met “secretly” at a lodge in the Tsavo game park, watched over by a former United Nations secretary-general, Kofi Annan, and resumed talks this week. They have agreed to stop the violence, address the humanitarian emergency, bring perpetrators of ethnic cleansing to justice and set up an independent review of the election. But can they agree on the grand coalition government Kenya needs to haul itself back from the brink?
肯尼亚各方正向达成最终协议靠近,这些协议将用来应对当前政治动荡。然而,这将的协议有意义么?谈判小组在联合国前秘书长科菲·安南监督下,于上周在自然公园的一个住处秘密地见面了。这周,谈判恢复,双方同意停止暴行,解决人道主义危机,将实施种族清洗的罪犯送到法庭,重新举行一次独立的选举。但是,他们会同意建立一个目前肯尼亚所需要的大联合政府以把这个国家从内容的边缘拉回来吗?
If an agreement continues to elude the negotiators, or if one is produced and proves flimsy, the violence that has racked parts of the country since its disputed election on December 27th could return. Some1,000 Kenyans have been killed so far and more than 300,000 displaced.
如果协议不能得到代表们的认同,或如果产生出来的这样一个协议被证明是软弱无力的话,暴行会卷土重来。自从12月27日选举产生争议以来,这场席卷肯尼亚一部分地区的暴行已经有1000个肯尼亚人被杀死,另有超过30万人流离失所。
On February 21st the head of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Raila Odinga, was still holding out for a change in the constitution that would create a prime minister's post. Mr Odinga assumes he would be this figure in a transitional government and that half his cabinet would be party colleagues. In return, he would drop objections to Mwai Kibaki staying on as president until new elections in two years' time. The president would remain “head of state”, but with reduced powers. The prime minister would become “head of government”, answerable to parliament[u1] .
2月21日,反对党橙色民主运动的领导人奥廷加仍然试图拖延时间以对争取修宪,从而实现创设一个首相职位的目的。奥廷加先生认为他将在一个过渡政府中担任这一角色,内阁一半的成员也将是他的党内同事。作为回报,在两年后新的选举之前,他将放弃拒绝承认甘巴里担任总统。总统仍将是“国家领导人”,但权力将有所减少,而他担任的首相将成为“政府领导人”,对议会负责。
Mr Odinga says Mr Kibaki promised him a similar role back in 2002, in return for supporting his presidential bid, but then reneged. If the present talks fail, he says, there will be more “mass action”. That sounds like incitement. But it is probably true that not even Mr Odinga, a mesmerising[u2] presence to his supporters, will be able to control the hate-mongers[u3] on his side if he is left empty-handed again.
奥廷加先生说甘巴里总统在2002年的时候曾许诺他一个类似的职位,以作为支持他担任总统的回报,但后来甘巴里总统失言了。奥廷加先生表示,如果当前的谈判失败,肯尼亚会出现更多“大规模行动”。这听起来像是煽动,这听起来像是煽动,但也许可能真的如果奥廷加先生两手空空一无所获的话,就算他对于那些支持者有足够吸引力,他也无法控制支持他的那些煽动仇恨的家伙们。
Agreeing to keep Mr Kibaki in office is a big concession. Election observers mostly agree that Mr Kibaki stole the decisive votes to squeak[u4] back in for a second term. Yet the bigger concession will have to come from the government. By divvying up[u5] many of the powers of the president to a new prime minister and a parliament that is used to being sidelined, the government will be excluding the Kikuyu hardliners and financiers who, since independence in 1963, have used the presidency as an easy lock on power and wealth. Mr Kibaki is keen that any accord should be under the existing constitution, and this reluctance to ditch[u6] the hardliners may be why negotiations have dragged on[u7] so slowly. But on February 21st a government negotiator said that the post of prime minister had been “more or less agreed on”; it would have executive powers but be subject to a sunset clause, expiring either with the dissolution of parliament or the enactment of a new constitution.
同意让甘巴里纽结担任总统对于奥廷加先生来说是一个巨大的让步。大多数选举观察员们都同意甘巴里先生通过做手脚才非常勉强地获得了他担任总统的第二个任期。然而政府将不得不作出更大的让步。总统要把他的许多权力分给新设的总理和议会,而议会过去常常是作为旁观者存在的。新政府将排除基库尤强硬派和金融家们,而这些人自肯尼亚1963年独立以来,一直把总统职位作为确保他们的权力和财富的捷径。甘巴里先生强烈要求任何协定都要在现在宪法下制定,他不愿意清除那些强硬派,这也许是目前为什么谈判进展如此慢的原因。但是在2月21日,一个政府代表表示首相的职位已经“或多或少地被同意了”,它将拥有行政执行权力但要服从原有的条款,这意味着排除了解散议会或实行新宪法。
Some pessimists meanwhile point out that a divided executive may make Kenya more unstable, especially if the division is along ethnic lines. That is a risk most ordinary Kenyans are ready to take. They are backed by America, the European Union and the African Union. George Bush, on a five-nation visit to Africa this week, emphasised that Kenya needs “real” power-sharing. He sent his secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, on a one-day visit to Nairobi to push the two sides closer. She promised generosity in return for a unity government—but gave warning that “the current stalemate and the circumstances are not going to permit business as usual with the United States.”
一些悲观主义者同时指出,权力的划分也许会使肯尼亚更加不稳定,特别是如果这种权力划分是按种族界限来的话。但这是一个大多数普通肯尼亚人准备接受的冒险。他们得到了美国、欧盟和非盟的支持。本周在非洲进行五国访问的美国总统布什强调肯尼亚需要“真正的”分享权力。他派他的国务聊赖斯,对肯尼亚首都内罗毕进行为时一天的访问,以推动双方的和解。赖斯许诺说如果肯尼亚能成立一个联合政府的话,美国会慷慨解囊以作为回报。但她同时警告说,“目前的政治僵局和环境将无法使肯尼亚与美国照常往来。”<hr class=msocomoff align=left width="33%" SIZE=1>
[u1]hold out for
[口](为等待更好时机)拖延时间
[u2]Mesmerize v.施以催眠术, 迷住
[u3]煽动仇恨者
[u4]非常勉强地通过; 非常侥幸地成功[获胜]
[u5]分掉; 分摊
[u6]]摆脱, 抛开, 避开; 逃避
[u7]拖延
阳光男孩- 大将
- 帖子数 : 232
注册日期 : 08-02-22
闵行春秋 :: 求知若渴 :: 世界历史 :: 发展中国家现代化比较
第1页/共1页
您在这个论坛的权限:
您不能在这个论坛回复主题